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Lawyers Amid the Redemption
of the South
Paul D. Carrington*
I. ON JUDGING THE PAST
Francis Lieber wisely enjoined us not to judge Moses by the
standards of Sparta.' In judging individuals distant or now dead,
we are tempted to be more harsh than when judging persons close
at hand whose humanity is more visible to us. In thinking about
friends and family, we are more prone to accept the dictum: "Judge
not, that you be not judged."2 Indeed, among the most common
human failings is a failure of moral courage, i.e., the unwillingness
to risk the loss of companionship, affection and love to do and to
judge what is right and just. Few of us do not flee the moral sanc-
tions of hatred and ostracism imposed by our neighbors and our
kin. Yet, it is easy to withstand odium imposed by foreigners or
members of another tribe, and for that reason, we seldom fully per-
ceive the pressures to which distant others are subject. It is easy
to see and to say that we would not be ethnic cleansers, but there is
a dark side to all our natures, and we have not been tested in our
ability to withstand the hatred and ostracism befalling those who
call attention to the evil of others, especially of our near and dear.
Because we are often weak in moral courage, it is in our na-
tures to rationalize the conduct in which we find ourselves and our
* Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. This essay was prepared for
presentation to a Symposium on Lawyer Collaboration with Systems of Evil, held
at the Roger Williams University School of Law on April 16, 1999. It is based on a
chapter of a work in progress, entitled The Romance of American Law: Lawyers in
American History. Robert Rodes made helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am
also indebted to Dan Coquillette, whose work not otherwise cited, was fresh in my
mind when I wrote this. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Lawyers and Fundamental
Moral Responsibility (1995).
1. See 1 Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics 311 (Theodore D. Woolsey
ed., 2d ed. 1911) (1876).
2. Matthew 7:1.
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friends engaged; social scientists denote this as the tendency to re-
solve cognitive dissonance. 3 The tendency is manifested when we
fantasize about events in order to avoid the pain of condemning
one's self. Such fantasies and the sentiments that give rise to them
are infectious and can produce what Hugh Henry Brackenridge de-
noted as "moral influenza," a disease depriving whole tribes and
nations of sensible moral judgment.4 It is this form of influenza
that explains the blindness of whole nations to the barbarism of
ethnic cleansing and makes ethnic cleansers of otherwise sane and
decent folk. Lieber does not, however, enjoin us to withhold all
moral judgment about the past. We must learn from past failures
of moral courage and we cannot do so without deploying moral
judgment. Yet we should, in judging individuals, be cautious and
take account of the moral environment in which they lived.
II. ON JUDGING LAWYERS
We are less constrained in imposing our moral judgment on
lawyers who work in other cultures or past times, because we
share with them certain moral precepts that are derived from our
common professional roles. In one respect, however, lawyers who
collaborate with evil ought to be judged less harshly because they
are lawyers. When lawyers perform professional services as coun-
selors and advocates to seemingly evil persons performing seem-
ingly evil deeds, they may be performing a public service. They
may be enabling the law to perform its mission with respect to
such persons. This is especially so with respect to their represen-
tation of persons charged with crimes; but, in civil matters too, it is
useful that malefactors receive competent advice and honest
representation.
On the other hand, for at least three reasons, we are justified
in imposing on lawyers, as a privileged class, a special duty to re-
frain from collaboration with evil. First, lawless behavior is gener-
3. The term belongs to Leon Festinger. See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cog-
nitive Dissonance (Stanford Univ. Press 1962) (1957). The idea is that most people
will seldom long endure a dissonance between their conduct and their moral be-
liefs. If we are impelled to do a thing, we will generally modify our beliefs to justify
our deeds. See id.
4. See Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry 641 (Claude M. Newlin
ed., American Book Co. 1937) (1792). For a summation of Brackenridge's work, see
Paul D. Carrington, Law and Chivalry: An Exhortation from the Spirit of the Hon.
Hugh Henry Brackenridge of Pittsburgh (1748-1816), 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 705 (1992).
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ally unbecoming to a lawyer, especially if the participation in
lawlessness occurs in the performance of professional work as an
officer of a court. Lawyers who deploy their professional talents to
join their clients in cheating are, again in Brackenridge's phrase,
not lawyers at all, but assassins of other people's rights.5 The line
between honest advice and representation and participation in a
client's evil deeds is often murky, and complicated by the existence
of a relationship that antedates the evil, or at least the visibility of
the evil. But that is why good lawyers not infrequently fire their
clients. A lawyer wishing to retain moral stature must be willing
from time to time to exercise that option, and one who fails to do so
can fairly be judged a collaborator.
Second, there are evils that are not merely contrary to law re-
flecting general social norms, but special evils that violate moral
precepts intrinsic to law itself, to which lawyers owe special alle-
giance. The luminous work of Lon Fuller serves for the present
purpose to define that morality.6 He observed certain characteris-
tics of legal texts and institutions that together form the essence of
law, such as publicity, comprehensibility, possibility of compliance
and congruence between the rules as announced and their admin-
istration. The total absence of any of eight such characteristics de-
prives a text of its status as law.7 Those who administer law must
respect and nurture those characteristics.
Fuller is careful to say that this morality is one of aspiration,
not of duty,8 but he observes that law's morality of aspiration "is
after all a morality of human aspiration. It cannot refuse the
human quality to human beings without repudiating itself."9 In
other words, the idea of equal protection, at least in its more con-
fined senses, is implicit in the idea of law. In this respect, Fuller
tells us, the morality of law is not merely aspirational, but imposes
a positive duty on those who share the privilege of administering it
to respect the humanity of fellow citizens. Thus, lawyers who par-
5. See Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Law Miscellanies xi-xii (Philadelphia, P.
Byrne 1814).
6. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964) [hereinafter Fuller, Moral-
ity of Law]; see also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958) (discussing the distinctions between
law and morality).
7. See Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 6, at 39.
8. See id. at 3-32.
9. Id. at 183.
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ticipate in ethnic cleansing carry the additional moral burden that
they are not only inhumane, but they are in direct violation of the
most elementary moral precept of law. They are evil lawyers.
The duty of lawyers to be faithful to this idea of law as equal
treatment is heightened by the demands of self-government. Toc-
queville observed the special responsibility of the legal profession
for the stability of a democratic society. 10 Frederick Grimke, 11
Francis Lieber 12 and Timothy Walker 13 were contemporaries of
Tocqueville who elaborated on the public responsibility of the pro-
fession. Their works were well-known to nineteenth century
American lawyers. Fuller's notion was implicit in the work of
each.
Third, lawyers ought be held to a higher moral standard than
others, because they are by training and experience better than
most at resisting the resolution of cognitive dissonance. Any law
student who has argued a moot court case knows how an involve-
ment in a cause, even one that is initially distasteful, can become a
pious crusade. It was that familiar process that caused senior law-
yers to tender the advice to young lawyers: "when in the course of
bitter litigation it becomes apparent that someone must go to jail,
be sure that it is your client that goes and not yourself." It is often
a lawyer's duty to correct a client's factual misperception, occa-
sioned by the client's instinct to avoid self-condemnation. Almost
the first thing some of us learned as lawyers was not to believe our
clients, for they have often misinformed themselves. Because it is
generally in the interest of their clients, as well as themselves to do
so, lawyers, with experience, learn to detect in themselves the ten-
dencies to rationalize and fantasize, and to resist them. It is there-
fore reasonable to expect lawyers to be better able to resist these
tendencies in public discourse, and to serve as physicians to heal
the "moral influenza" of which Brackenridge wrote. 14 They share a
duty to recognize and dispel fantasies when they infect public dis-
course, as so often they do.
10. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 242-48 (J.P. Mayer &
Max Lerner eds., 1966).
11. See Frederick Grimke, The Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions
(John William Ward ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1848).
12. See Lieber, supra note 1.
13. See Timothy Walker, Introduction to American Law (Da Capo Press 1972)
(1837).
14. See Brackenridge, supra note 4, at 641.
LAWYERS AMID THE REDEMPTION
III. THE REDEMPTION
In this article, I will describe the roles of four lawyers whose
careers bore on efforts after the Civil War to incorporate former
slaves and their descendants into American society. The reader
will know that from 1868 to 1876, the Grant Administration
deployed military force in the former states of the Confederacy to
support democratic government in which many former slaves par-
ticipated. In 1876, that effort collapsed. John Mercer Langston,
perhaps the most eminent of the first generation of African-Ameri-
can lawyers,' 5 observed in 1877:
Sixteen years ago there were three distinct classes composing
the population of the South; the first, the slaveholding class,
the lords of the land and the lash; the next, the class known
as the "poor whites," the under grade of Southern society; and
thirdly, the Negroes, slaves, chattels personal. The first class
were not only the owners of the wealth, but they possessed
the education and the intelligence, the social and political in-
fluence of their various communities.... Deprived by the
war largely of [their] property, [their] numbers considerably
reduced by the same cause, . . . [they] rallied, reorganized,
assumed again political control, and once more promised to
dominate the entire section.16
15. Langston was educated at Oberlin, admitted to the Ohio bar, and elected
to public office in Oberlin. He recruited soldiers during the Civil War, but refused
to serve unless commissioned. With Frederick Douglass and George Vashon, he
formed the National Equal Rights League to lobby for the rights of Negroes, in-
cluding freedmen. Forsaking his law practice in Oberlin, he undertook to travel,
lecturing to every available audience on the importance of black voting rights.
While he lacked the charisma of Douglass, he won respect by his calm manner,
quick repartee, and knowledge of pertinent facts. In 1867, he became Inspector of
Schools for the Freedmen's Bureau, devoting two years to visiting black schools in
the South, consulting local officials, and lecturing teachers and parents on their
responsibilities. In 1869, he was rewarded for his efforts with appointment as
founding dean of the Howard Law School. For his autobiography, see John Mercer
Langston, From the Virginia Plantation to the National Capitol (Bergman Pub.
1969) (1894). One of his students would later designate him the "paterfamilias of
the Negro lawyer in America." D. Augustus Straker, The Negro in the Profession of
Law, 8 A.M.E. Church Rev. 180 (1891).
16. John Mercer Langston, Pacific Reconstruction: The Other Phase of Recon-
struction-Pacification the True Policy, in Freedom and Citizenship: Selected Lec-
tures and Addresses of Hon. John Mercer Langston 209, 210 (Mnemosyne Pub.
Inc. 1969) (1883). This was a speech delivered at the Congregational Tabernacle in
Jersey City, N.J. on April 17, 1877. See id.
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IV. DANIEL HENRY CHAMBERLAIN
Events occurring in South Carolina in 1876 illustrate the
political process depicted by Langston. The governor of that state
was Daniel Chamberlain, a native of Worcester, Massachusetts, an
1862 graduate of Yale, a former Harvard law student and active
abolitionist and a former officer of the Fifth Massachusetts, a regi-
ment composed of black soldiers. He had moved to South Carolina
in 1866, apparently in the hope of prospering as a cotton planter
utilizing his ability to work with black farmers. Like others who
had this idea, he was not successful in organizing a new kind of
plantation, and he was soon practicing law in Charleston. 17
The election of 1868 was conducted pursuant to the Recon-
struction Act in the presence of a federal military force. It was con-
trolled by the state's Republican party, then led by African-
Americans.' 8 Chamberlain was elected as the state's attorney gen-
eral. The governor elected that year proved to be astonishingly
corrupt. He was said to be "a blatant swindler,"' 9 "entirely devoid
of moral sense,"20 to the point of selling fifty-seven pardons on his
last day in office. The state fisc was a disaster. Despite this grim
corruption, the number of children in public schools, and the
number of teachers employed by the state tripled; where only a
ninth of the state's children were in school in 1869, the proportion
had risen to a third by 1873. In 1873, Chamberlain was among the
trustees of the University of South Carolina responsible for the ad-
mission of black students, a decision resulting in the departure of
many white students and faculty. 2 1
17. See generally James Green, Personal Recollections of Daniel Henry Cham-
berlain 8 (1908) ('At the close of the war, a college classmate who had practiced
law in Charleston, South Carolina, died there, and Chamberlain was called upon
to go to Charleston and settle his affairs.").
18. See generally J.R. Oldfield, A High and Honorable Calling: Black Lawyers
in South Carolina, 1868-1915, 23 J. Am. Stud. 395, 395 (1989) (discussing the ad-
mittance of many African-Americans to the South Carolina bar during this period).
19. See John S. Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina, 1865-1877, at
225 (Greenwood Pub. Corp. 1969) (1905).
20. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877,
at 542 (1988) (footnote omitted).
21. For an account of the event, see Richard Nelson Current, Those Terrible
Carpetbaggers 328 (1988).
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In 1874, Chamberlain ran as a Republican candidate for gov-
ernor. 22 When elected, it was apparently Chamberlain's hope to
win some white support, or at least respectability among white ob-
servers, for Republican government. He reorganized the state fisc,
collected taxes, reduced the state payroll and expenditures, re-
duced the state militia and removed some of the least competent
Republicans, including some black trial judges and school officials,
sometimes replacing them with white Democrats. Within a year,
he had become the toast of Charleston drawing rooms, but the de-
spair of many of his former supporters. Friction with his African-
American supporters may have stirred in Chamberlain private
doubts about the competence of some of his constituents, but in
accepting renomination in 1876, he reaffirmed his faith that "the
colored masses of South Carolina, were as loyal as any people in
this country to the demands and necessity of good government in
South Carolina."23 He also appears to have attempted to groom an
African-American congressman as his replacement in the Gover-
nor's office.
The presidential campaign of 1876 was a pivotal event.24 It
was conducted during a serious economic depression triggered by
the bank panic of 1873. William Tilden, the Democratic candidate
from New York, attained a significant majority in the reported pop-
ular vote in all states. But Republicans plausibly claimed fraud
and intimidation in Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina; if these
claims were upheld by Congress, Tilden would fail to win the elec-
tion by one electoral vote. A majority of those elected to Congress
were Democrats.
The campaign in South Carolina had proved to be gruesome.
One planter-lawyer had circulated a "Plan of the Campaign"25 obli-
gating each white citizen in the state to intimidate one black, de-
claring that black citizens "can only be influenced by their fears."26
22. See Thomas Holt, Black over White: Negro Political Leadership in South
Carolina During Reconstruction 176 (1977).
23. Walter Allen, Governor Chamberlain's Administration in South Carolina:
A Chapter of Reconstruction in the Southern States 357 (Books for Libraries Press
1969) (1888).
24. For a brief account, see Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction,
1863-1877, at 238-42 (1990).
25. Francis Butler Simkins & Robert Hilliard Woody, South Carolina During
Reconstruction 564 (Peter Smith 1966) (1932).
26. Id. at 566.
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On July 4, a white farmer took offense at a parade in the largely
black town of Hamburg, and caused a melee. In the aftermath, a
former Confederate General demanded that the black militia in
Hamburg be disarmed. When the black marshal refused the de-
mand, the general left, but returned with hundreds of members of
white "rifle clubs" and a cannon. When the militia tried to flee, the
black marshal was killed, twenty-five men were captured and five
of these were killed in cold blood. Chamberlain denounced the
event as a massacre, but some white South Carolinians declared it
to be the beginning of Redemption.
In August, Wade Hampton, a once wealthy planter who had
lost all in the war, was nominated to run against Chamberlain.
Few African-Americans believed Hampton's benign campaign
promises, and some attacked persons leaving a Democratic meet-
ing in Charleston, wounding several and killing one.2 7 Wearing
red shirts, armed, and riding mules, Hampton's supporters roused
large crowds of white Democrats and disrupted Republican gather-
ings. In some counties, rifle clubs drove blacks from their homes
and murdered several Republican leaders.
Chamberlain nevertheless won in almost every county, except
two where virtually no Republican votes were counted. On the ba-
sis of the vote in those two counties, Hampton claimed a narrow
victory. Chamberlain refused to accept the vote in the two coun-
ties, reporting that he and Hayes had received almost no votes,
and, with military support from the Grant Administration, re-
mained in office. Hampton had himself inaugurated, too. For four
months, the dispute raged. Chamberlain's life was threatened re-
peatedly. Hampton also threatened to arrest Chamberlain for
bribery, despite the lack of any evidence that he was guilty of that
offense. "Here I stand," Chamberlain said, "I can do no other-
wise."28 His devoted wife "lived in daily and nightly dread that the
hand of an assassin would take her husband."29
The Presidential Election Commission disallowed the Demo-
cratic vote in the two challenged counties in South Carolina and
declared that Hayes had won the presidency. President Hayes
promptly asked Chamberlain to resign, even though he had at-
tained a more favorable vote in South Carolina than had Hayes.
27. See Foner, supra note 20, at 573-74.
28. Allen, supra note 23, at 447.
29. Id. at 466 (quoting Dr. H.V, Redfield).
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Chamberlain angrily refused. At the same time, Hampton sup-
porters sent word that Chamberlain could have the open seat in
the United States Senate if he would leave the Governor's office.
President Hayes then advised Chamberlain that the federal troops
would be withdrawn. Chamberlain announced that he would nev-
ertheless remain in his office, come what may. At this point, four
black cabinet officers implored him to give up peacefully; he did so.
Almost half of the persons identified as Northern abolitionists
supported Hayes' action in withdrawing the military and making
peace with persons such as Hampton, holding that it was "better, I
must say, that the colored people generally vote with the Demo-
cratic party than to be slaughtered by hundreds."30 As Chamber-
lain rightly perceived, the North, in the throes of depression and
threatened by widespread violence by unemployed workers, was
"tired of the Southern question" and wanted "a settlement, no mat-
ter what."31 And thus, as Langston described, the slave-owning
class was redeemed in South Carolina.
V. L.Q.C. Lmn
Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, Jr. was born in 1825 to a
wealthy Georgia Huguenot family.32 An uncle was to become a
President of the Republic of Texas opposing annexation. 33 His fa-
ther, who built a successful practice in Georgia, was an alumnus of
the celebrated Litchfield Law School in Connecticut. He was af-
forded an education in the classics, as befitted a member of his
class. After his father committed suicide, apparently in a moment
of clinical depression, Lamar acquired a close relation to his
teacher at Emory College, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet,34 an-
30. James M. McPherson, The Abolitionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to
the NAACP 91 (1975) (quoting Samuel May, a friend of Garrison).
31. Id. at 90 (quoting Letter from Chamberlain to Francis J. Garrison (Mar.
18, 1877)).
32. See Wirt Armistead Cate, Lucius Q.C. Lamar: Secession and Reunion 15-
21 (1935). For additional biographies of Lamar, see Edward Mayes, Lucius Q.C.
Lamar: His Life, Times, and Speeches: 1825-1893 (2d ed. 1896); James B. Murphy,
L.Q.C. Lamar: Pragmatic Patriot (1973); Michael H. Hoffheimer, L.Q.C. Lamar
1825-1893, 63 Miss. L.J. 5 (1993); Daniel J. Meador, Lamar to Posterity-A
Centennial Memoir, 63 Miss. L.J. 107 (1993).
33. See 5 Dictionary of American Biography 553 (Dumas Malone ed., 1961).
34. See generally John Donald Wade, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet: A Study
of the Development of Culture in the South 245 (1924) (discussing Longstreet's
tenure at Emory College).
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other Litchfield graduate who had become a prominent Methodist
clergyman. 35
Longstreet, in the pre-war years, held firmly to the disunionist
opinion that there was no place for the slave-owning class control-
ling the South in the prevailing American culture. During Lamar's
time at Emory, Longstreet led the proslavery or antiabolitionist
movement among the Methodist clergy, causing a schism; the
schism resulted in the establishment of Southern Methodism in
1845.36 Lamar graduated in 1845 and then served a legal appren-
ticeship with another uncle in Macon. He married Longstreet's
daughter, and in 1849 when Longstreet became the President of
the University of Mississippi, he and his wife settled nearby.
Mississippi at the time counted 370,000 people, about half of
them slaves. Its university had opened in 1848. Congressman Ja-
cob Thompson,37 the chairman of a governing board, was a political
ally of Jefferson Davis, then serving as senior United States Sena-
tor. The University was handsomely equipped with a campus
before it had a student; the campus was centered on a Lyceum to
celebrate its continuity with classical traditions. The first presi-
dent was an Englishman who came to Mississippi from William
and Mary,38 but he was soon succeeded by Longstreet. There being
no rule against nepotism, Lamar joined Longstreet on the faculty
as a professor of mathematics, a subject in which he had no inter-
est, but the appointment provided him with some useful income
while he sought to build a law practice.
By 1850, Lamar was active in Mississippi politics as an advo-
cate for the expansion of slavery to western territories, ardently
opposing the admission of California and supporting the first calls
for a meeting to consider secession. 39 He won public notice by a
passionate impromptu speech challenging the words of a United
35. See id.; Edward Mayes, Geneology and History of Lamar and Related
Families 17-18 (1935).
36. See Henry Morton Bullock, A History of Emory University 85-88 (1936);
Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the South 228 (Harper &
Row 1964) (1940); Wade, supra note 34, at 270-77.
37. Thompson served six terms, from 1839 to 1851.
38. See Sylvester John Hemleben & Richard T. Bennett, A Historical Sketch of
the Early Law School of the University of Mississippi: A Newly Found Memoir, 37
Miss. L.J. 28, 32 (1965).
39. See James W. Garner, The First Struggle over Secession in Mississippi, 4
Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society 91 (1901).
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States senator to an Oxford audience; his speech resulted in his
being carried from the hall on the shoulders of university students.
His views were, however, successfully opposed by a Union party
that favored compromise; the Unionists held sway in Mississippi
through the decade of the 1850s. Senator Jefferson Davis held the
centrist position, favoring secession only as a last resort. Lamar
rejected moderation; like his father-in-law and uncle, he saw no
merit in the Union with Northern states, which he regarded as
agents of a New England manufacturers' conspiracy bent on sub-
duing the Southern planters.40 He disavowed loyalty to the United
States, proclaiming his commitment to the South to be second only
to his commitment to Southern honor.41
For reasons that are not recorded, Lamar's law practice did
not flourish. In 1851, he resigned his position as a mathematics
professor at the University, and returned to Georgia to practice
law for a time with an old friend. When his partner became sick,
that practice failed. He tried again in Macon, but also failed to
attract clients there. His forays in Georgia politics were no more
successful than those in Mississippi. So, in 1854, he returned to
the shelter of his father-in-law's home in Oxford, Mississippi,
where his wife had remained during the time of his return to Geor-
gia, awaiting a time when he could support his family.
That year, the legislature authorized Longstreet's University
to establish a Department of Governmental Science and Law.42
Thompson's governing board explained its aim to be the training of
young Mississippians for public leadership. The teaching of "law
alone" was not the objective; they sought to teach history and polit-
ical philosophy as well. The models for such a law department
were those at the College of William and Mary and Transylvania
University in Lexington, Kentucky. 43 The latter was an institu-
tion attended by many Mississippi lawyers, including Jefferson
Davis. The founders of the Mississippi Law School hoped that "[a]
youth coming from the walls of the University with enlarged and
fixed principles of political justice-with elevated notions of the
40. See Mayes, supra note 32, at 73-74 (footnote omitted).
41. See Cate, supra note 32, at 58.
42. See Edward Mayes, History of Education in Mississippi 143 (1899).
43. See Paul D. Carrington, Teaching Law and Virtue at Transylvania Univer-
sity: The George Wythe Tradition in the Antebellum Years, 41 Mercer L. Rev. 673,
698 (1990).
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use, the scope and the design of government-would not be apt to
sink into a factionist, or to merge the philosophic statesman in the
turbulent demagogue."4
There is no evidence that Lamar, despite his connection to
Longstreet, was considered for appointment as the professor of
law. Instead, William F. Stearns was appointed; a native of New
England, Stearns was an experienced lawyer practicing in nearby
Holly Springs; he was said to have been "a lawyer's lawyer in that
much of his work grew out of consultations with lawyers on their
cases."45 He was also a Unionist. Stearns established a two-year
course that attracted more than 100 students in the seven years
before the War, making it by the standards of the time a successful
program. In 1859, he was joined by a second professor, James
Trotter, who was, in addition, a member of the Supreme Court of
the state.
By 1857, Lamar at last enjoyed some success, being nominated
by a deadlocked Democratic convention, and then elected to Con-
gress, where he undertook to defend the interests of slaveowners.
Mississippi was by the mid-1850s, a center of the proslavery ex-
pansionist sentiment that Lamar professed. Many Mississippians
were among those hoping to secure control of Cuba and what re-
mained of Mexico for the purpose of creating additional slave
states. Congressman Lamar did not openly approve their lawless
banditry in conducting private military invasions of Mexico and
Nicaragua, but he protested their arrests by the United States,46
and on occasion endorsed their vision of a slavery empire ex-
tending to Cape Horn. 4 7 Lamar was also adamant in his opposi-
tion to the admission of Kansas as a non-slave state.48 He
denounced the idea that the people of Kansas should be permitted
to vote against a proslavery state constitution prepared by a group
composed chiefly of interloping Missouri slave owners. Arriving in
Washington, he became known among Southern politicians as
"'Moody'" Lamar in recognition of his periods of depression, and as
"'Lushe'" Lamar in recognition of his effeminate manners and his
44. Daniel J. Meador, Lamar and the Law at the University of Mississippi, 34
Miss. L.J. 227, 232-33 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
45. Hemleben & Bennett, supra note 38, at 42.
46. See House Journal, 35th Cong., 2nd sess. 169-70 (1859).
47. See Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st sess. 279-81 (1858).
48. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 39-43.
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seemingly irresistible impulses to kiss his male colleagues. 49 His
manners did not prevent his participation in a fistfight on the floor
of Congress with Owen Lovejoy, an antislavery Congressman from
Illinois.50 By 1860, Lamar was closely allied with the more moder-
ate Senator Davis, but he was nevertheless quick to slip the traces
of moderation and joined Southerners walking out of the Demo-
cratic party in protest at the prospect that Stephen Douglas,
deemed insufficiently reliable as a friend of slavery, would be nom-
inated to oppose Lincoln.51
Lamar then, for reasons that remain obscure, announced his
retirement from Congress. He accepted an appointment tendered
by Longstreet's successor to become Professor of Ethics and Meta-
physics at the University, planning to instruct law students as well
as undergraduates. Yet, he took time to participate in shaping
Mississippi's role in the Confederacy. He authored the idea that
the Confederacy should adopt the existing Constitution of the
United States with only such modifications as the seceding states
might agree to. And he also led opposition in the state convention
to the proposal that the people of Mississippi be permitted to vote
on the ordinance of secession; apparently fearing that a majority of
Mississippians would have voted to remain in the Union.52
Lamar continued his ethics teaching for only a few months.
By September 1861, the University had only four students and
closed. Lamar had by then helped to organize a regiment. His reg-
iment marched to Richmond, where for a time, he became a major
figure in the drawing rooms of the Confederacy's elite.53 Appar-
ently as a result of stress associated with the anticipation of mili-
tary combat, he suffered apoplexy resembling a stroke and retired
from his command. He returned to military service to participate
in the Peninsula campaign of 1862, but thereafter again suffered a
stress-related attack. By the time of his recovery from that attack,
his home in Mississippi had been overrun by Grant's army. He
was then sent to Russia on a diplomatic mission, but it was aborted
when the Confederate Senate, in anger at European indifference to
49. Id. at 37 (quoting Clement C. Clay, A Belle of the Fifties 48 (New York,
1889)).
50. See id. at 41-42.
51. See id. at 51-52.
52. See id. at 59.
53. See Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie 67-72 (Ben Ames Williams
ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1949) (1905).
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their plight, refused to confirm his appointment. He returned to
the drawing rooms of Richmond. In 1864, he was sent by President
Davis to Georgia to defend the suspension of habeas corpus and
rally, support for the Confederacy. Soon after his return, he lost
favor with Davis by criticizing the performance of Confederate
generals at the Battle of Shiloh. Recommissioned as a judge advo-
cate, he was at Appomattox when Lee surrendered on April 3,
1865.54
Lamar returned to Oxford, then a ruin of war, where he was
reunited with his wife and daughters and the aged Longstreets. He
had lost both brothers and both law partners in the war, an experi-
ence he shared with many surviving Southerners. He lost his
plantation when his father-in-law reclaimed it for non-payment of
interest on the mortgage. He again tried to practice law amid the
ruins. He was, however, relieved of that burden in 1866 by a re-
newal of his appointment at the University. He soon became a
Professor of Law,55 a position he held for four years. His students
were impressed: "he was so superior to other men," we are told,
"Colonel Lamar was so grand."56 In teaching law, he not only as-
signed Kent, Greenleaf and other conventional works, but directed
his students to read and discuss judicial opinions; he was thus
among those teachers who prefigured the development of "the case
method." He drilled his students daily, and lectured to them on
history and politics.5 7
In 1869, Grant was inaugurated and Reconstruction came to
Mississippi. A new Governor was elected with the votes of
freemen, and a new board of trustees was appointed to conduct the
University. There was talk of admitting black students. Perhaps
to forestall his dismissal, Lamar resigned his professorship.58 "I
have been very successful as a law professor," he proclaimed.5 9
At that time, he entered on a brief period of prosperity as
counsel to a railroad, but it failed in 1877, leaving him a person of
modest means. He also defended several members of the Ku Klux
Klan charged with violating the civil rights of black Mississippi-
54. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 84.
55. See Hemleben & Bennett, supra note 38, at 48; Meador, supra note 44, at
230-32.
56. Meador, supra note 44, at 242 (footnote omitted).
57. See id. at 239-44.
58. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 97-98.
59. Mayes, supra note 32, at 128.
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ans, but there is no evidence of his personal involvement in their
activities. 6° He was for a brief time suspended from practice in the
federal court as punishment for punching a United States marshal,
an act for which he may have been lionized by the substantial con-
stituency in Mississippi who indiscriminately despised federal
officers.
In 1872, Lamar cautiously returned to politics. He was the
one Democrat among the seven Congressmen from Mississippi tak-
ing seats in December 1873. His aim was to rid Mississippi and
the South of the military occupation and federal control that had
enabled the Reconstruction governments to form. The task, he
wrote a friend, was to "restore the constitutional faith of our fa-
thers,... to get rid of these creatures, defiled by blood, gorged with
spoil, cruel, cowardly, faithless, who are now ruling the South for
no purposes except those of oppression and plunder."6 1 He did not
identify Chamberlain as such a creature.
Seeking advice from Northern political leaders as to the condi-
tions on which the federal presence in Mississippi might be termi-
nated, Lamar formed the opinion that the only means for achieving
that result was to proclaim policies of moderation and goodwill to-
ward the North and toward freedmen. This strategy was unveiled
when he was afforded an opportunity to eulogize Charles Sumner.
In life, Sumner had been the embodiment of abolitionism and Re-
construction and had despised the class of Southerners whom La-
mar exemplified 62 and who reciprocated Sumner's feelings,
perhaps several fold. At the time of his death, Sumner had been
the proponent of a Civil Rights Act requiring even the churches in
the South to desegregate. Yet, Sumner had voted to restore the
civil liberties of Confederate leaders such as Lamar. Seizing on
that straw, Lamar falsely depicted Sumner, a hater, as a loving
and forgiving nationalist who sympathized with the suffering of
the South. Without acknowledging any fault in antebellum slav-
ery, he emphasized the great respect and affection Southerners
had come to feel for the great Sumner, and he closed by putting
60. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 100-01.
61. Mayes, supra note 32, at 170 (quoting Letter from Lucius Lamar to
Charles Reemelin (July 15, 1872)).
62. See generally David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man
(1970) (describing Sumner's views on equality). For a comparison of Sumner's in-
temperance with Lincoln's forbearance, see Paul D. Carrington, A Tale of Two
Lawyers, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 615 (1997).
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into the mouth of the deceased the sentiment: "My countrymen,
know one another, and you will love one another."6 3 This speech,
transparent though it now seems, and hypocritical as Lamar pri-
vately acknowledged it to have been,6 was received with wild en-
thusiasm by the Northern press, and by much of the South, save
those Southerners who were ardently unreconstructed and too
slow to see what Lamar was doing.
Lamar followed the triumph of his Sumner eulogy with an-
other when he spoke for withdrawal of federal intervention in
Southern elections. He assured Congress that there was not a sin-
gle Southerner who did not agree with his eulogy of Sumner, nor a
single black male who did not possess the vote. "There is not a
trace ofprivilege throughout the land.. . negro liberty is universal,
thorough, and complete, and their equality before the law is with-
out an exception."65 So great was their desire to believe that,
many in the North accepted these preposterous statements at face
value.
Lamar was embarrassed a few weeks later by a violent inci-
dent at Vicksburg. In August 1874, the "White Man's Party" pa-
trolled the streets of the town and intimidated black voters in a
town council election; in December, they returned to the streets
and by force of arms demanded the resignation of the black county
sheriff.6 The sheriff was supported by a black posse armed with
pistols and shotguns. 67 The White Man's Party, armed with rifles,
won the ensuing battle, although two of its members were killed.
Twenty-nine of the sheriffs supporters were killed, and in the next
few days, about 300 blacks were murdered.68 President Grant sent
in federal troops, and the sheriff was restored to office.69 Lamar
declined to make a public speech regarding the event, but he
played a very active role in orchestrating the efforts of the ruling
class of Mississippians to blame the event on the Reconstruction
63. 2 Cong. Rec. 3411 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1874) (statement of Lucius Q.C.
Lamar).
64. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 116 (citing Letter from Lucius Q.C. Lamar
to Mrs. Lamar (Apr. 28, 1874)).
65. 2 Cong. Rec. app. 428 (daily ed. June 8, 1874) (speech of Lucius Q.C.
Lamar).
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state government, and to "[sihow that there was no wanton or very
little needless slaughter of negroes." 70 And he wrote the New York
Herald to assure its readers that the end of Reconstruction would
result in the complete protection of Negroes' security and civil
rights.71 He became, indeed, an outspoken advocate of the voting
rights of African-American citizens unabashed by the frequent vio-
lent suppression of those rights by his constituents.
Lamar's efforts to reassure the North were successful. They
set the stage for President Grant's decision not to send federal
troops to supervise the Mississippi election of 1875. During the
campaign that followed, Lamar carried his message to the South,
again proclaiming the patriotism and goodwill of white Mississip-
pians and the right of black citizens to participate in Mississippi
politics. He attacked the Reconstruction government for having
cruelly divided black Mississippians from white. And he passion-
ately demanded the withdrawal of the federal presence that, he
alleged, was such an obstacle to the healing of Southern wounds,
all the while observing the growing repression of those of his fellow
citizens whose pigmentation he disapproved. As a result of the
Democratic victory of that year, the Reconstruction Governor re-
signed under pressure and the black Lieutenant Governor was im-
peached and removed.
Lamar was also in the forefront of the effort to resolve the con-
troversy over the election of 1876. As leader of the Mississippi
Congressional delegation, he temporized and supported the crea-
tion of a special commission to investigate the competing claims for
the electoral votes of Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina. As a
Democrat, he continued to support every contention favoring the
Democratic vote count, but in the end accepted the recommenda-
tions of the commission whose report favored the Republican can-
didate, Rutherford Hayes. Lamar early advised Hayes that the
South would accept that result peaceably, provided that Hayes
would withdraw the federal presence from the South. There is no
evidence that any bargain was struck, but the hated federal pres-
ence did recede in the early months of the Hayes presidency.7 2 At
70. Murphy, supra note 32, at 128 (quoting Letters from Lucius Q.C. Lamar to
E.D. Clark (Dec. 21, 1874)).
71. See New Orleans: Important Points in the Report of the Sub-Committee,
N.Y. Herald, Jan. 10, 1875, at 3.
72. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 177-78.
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least one Northern Democratic Congressman accused Lamar of
sacrificing Tilden's presidency for personal political advantage, an
accusation nearly resulting in another violent encounter on the
floor of the House.
Shortly after the inauguration of Hayes, Lamar was elected by
the Mississippi legislature to the Senate. Some Republicans op-
posed his swearing-in on the ground that the 1875 Mississippi leg-
islature was unlawfully elected. Lamar was saved from this
embarrassment by the intervention of the black senior Senator
from Mississippi, Blanche Bruce. Bruce had been a fugitive slave
who found his way to Oberlin College during the war and returned
to play a role in the Reconstruction government of the state. Bruce
and Lamar formed a seemingly real personal friendship and a
political alliance that endured for the four years that both were in
the Senate.7 3 Lamar reported to his friends that Bruce was "a no-
ble negro."74
When Hayes was slow to withdraw the federal presence, La-
mar remonstrated. It was on the day following receipt of Senator
Lamar's protest that the President summoned Governor Chamber-
lain from South Carolina to Washington and informed him that
the federal support for the Reconstruction government led by
Chamberlain would be withdrawn. Lamar gloated to a friend: "We
have no enemy in our front.... But the negroes are almost as well
disciplined in their silence and inactivity as they were before in
their aggressiveness."75
After the Congressional election of 1878, Senator Lamar re-
newed his claim that Mississippi elections were peaceable, that
"Inlot a human being was molested or made afraid."7 6 This time,
his false report was challenged in the press, and on the floor of the
Senate, where Senator Blaine of Maine called for an investigation
and a punitive reduction of Southern representation in Congress
as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment, if, as he suspected,
blacks had been prevented from voting. Lamar reiterated his bald
misstatement, and further explained that Southern Negroes had
73. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Blanche K. Bruce: United States Senator, 1875-
1881, 29 J. Miss. Hist. 118, 134 (1967).
74. Murphy, supra note 32, at 186 (quoting Letter from Lucius Q.C. Lamar to
E.D. Clark (Mar. 15, 1877)).
75. Foner, supra note 20, at 601 (quoting Lucius Q.C. Lamar after Hayes'
inauguration).
76. Murphy, supra note 32, at 202 (footnote omitted).
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realized that they were not yet ready to vote and had chosen not to
do so, but would do so when they were able.77 As he spoke, there
was renewed interest among black Southerners in emigration to
Africa or the west; thousands migrated to Kansas in search of
political equality, freedom from violence and access to education.78
Among the reasons for their eagerness to leave the South was the
devastation of public education; school children were increasingly
segregated by race, black children being assigned to schools pro-
vided with half the funds expended on whites. 79 If there were
those who complained about the emerging caste system, the Ku
Klux Klan or others of like bent would supply the violent response.
Lamar remained in the Senate for eight years, now a symbol of
the sectional reconciliation that brought an end not only to the
War, but to Reconstruction. In 1885, he represented the South in
the cabinet of President Grover Cleveland (who had defeated Sena-
tor Blaine for the presidency), serving as Secretary of the Interior.
In 1886, he was awarded an honorary doctorate by Harvard. 0 In
1888, he was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the first Southerner to be appointed to the Court since the Civil
War. For the latter appointment, he was confirmed by a narrow
margin, the opposition resting not only on his role in the Confeder-
acy, but also on his advanced age and his questionable competence
as a lawyer.
Although Chief Justice Fuller would eulogize him as one pos-
sessed of "the most suggestive mind I ever knew,"81 Lamar himself
lacked confidence in his own work as a Justice,8 2 and was never
assigned the writing of an important opinion of the Court. Oddly,
in light of the positions he had taken as a political leader, he fa-
77. See the exchange of the Senators in Symposium, James G. Blaine et al.,
Ought the Negro to Be Disfranchised? Ought He to Have Been Enfranchised?, 128
N. Am. Rev. 225, 233-34 (1879).
78. See Foner, supra note 20, at 600-01; John Mercer Langston, The Exodus:
The Causes Which Led the Colored People of the South to Leave Their Homes-The
Lesson of the Exodus, in Freedom and Citizenship: Selected Lectures and Ad-
dresses of Hon. John Mercer Langston, LL.D. 232 (Mnemosyne Pub. Inc. 1969)
(1883).
79. See John Hope Franklin, Jim Crow Goes to School: The Genesis of Legal
Segregation in Southern Schools, 58 S. Atlantic Q. 225 (1959).
80. See Cate, supra note 32, at 463.
81. See Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
82. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 264 (quoting Letter from Lucius Q.C. La-
mar to Burton N. Harrison (Apr. 11, 1889)).
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vored strict constitutional restraints on the powers of the states to
regulate interstate commerce.8 3 But, having himself once as-
saulted a United States marshal, he passionately dissented from
the Court's holding that Congress could authorize removal to fed-
eral court of the California prosecution of a marshal. He protested
that the decision divested the states "of what was once regarded as
their exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed within their own
territory, against their own laws."8 4 He died in 1893, in his fifth
year on the Court, perhaps before the full measure of his talents
for its work could be exhibited.
Lamar's name has enjoyed good repute during much of the
20th century. So good in fact that Lamar was elevated to the sta-
tus of hero by young John F. Kennedy, when in 1955 he wrote his
Profiles in Courage.85 Kennedy would have had us believe that La-
mar's eulogy of Sumner was an act of admirable moral courage.
Whether Lamar's career was consequential is uncertain. It
seems likely that moral exhaustion would have overtaken Recon-
struction with or without Lamar's help. If viewed from the per-
spective of the small class of persons whom he represented, he was
both loyal and courageous,8 6 and a man of admirable pragmatism
if, alas, a brazen practitioner of the big lie. If viewed from the
larger perspective of the American commonwealth, he was an in-
sidious provider of narcotic rhetoric serving to numb the moral
sensibilities of the people and their leaders, and a cynical servant
of privilege and arrogance. The sectional reconciliation identified
with his name was achieved at the expense of the rights of freed-
men and their descendants, and of Southerners hoping to pursue
the goals expressed in the Declaration of Independence and by Lin-
coln at Gettysburg. While Lamar proclaimed otherwise, the rights
of many citizens were systematically and violently suppressed.8 7
83. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1
(1888).
84. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 99 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting).
85. John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage 152-77 (1961).
86. This is the message of Cate, supra note 32.
87. Curiously, Lamar, though blind to the rights of black citizens was a con-
vinced feminist, advocating the rights of women to equality, at least in education.
See Meador, supra note 44, at 247-48.
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VI. JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER
A second lawyer member of the Southern aristocracy to play a
significant role in intersectional reconciliation was John Randolph
Tucker.88 Born in Winchester, Virginia in 1823, his father was
Henry St. George Tucker, and he was the third of five generations
of Tuckers who taught at four law schools in Virginia. His grand-
father had succeeded George Wythe, the first American law profes-
sor at William and Mary;8 9 his uncle held that same position from
1834 to 1851.90 His father, Henry St. George, was a state senator,
a congressman and a professor of law at the University of Vir-
ginia.91 John Randolph studied law under his father, receiving his
degree in 1844. He built a practice in Richmond and followed his
ancestors into Virginia politics.
Randy Tucker (as he then was known) first won public acclaim
in 1851 with a speech asserting the right of Virginia to withdraw
from the Federal Union.92 His argument was based partly on the
understanding of those who ratified the Constitution in 1788 be-
lieving they could secede if union should prove unsatisfactory. He
was surely correct that there would have been no union had it been
initially presented as an indissoluble one. In making his claim of
states' rights, Randy drew on the scholarship of his grandfather,
St. George Tucker. His grandfather's 1803 edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries on English Law contained a 439-page appendix on
American Constitutional Law that explicitly affirmed the right of
88. See Charles V. Laughlin, John Randolph Tucker, in Legal Education in
Virginia 1779-1979: A Biographical Approach 625 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 1982);
William Reynolds Vance, John Randolph Tucker: 1823-1897, in 7 Great American
Lawyers 321 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1909); John W. Davis, John Randolph
Tucker: The Man and His Work, 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 139 (1949).
89. His biographies include Imogene E. Brown, American Aristides: A Biogra-
phy of George Wythe (1981); William Clarkin, Serene Patriot: A Life of George
Wythe (1970); Theodore S. Cox, GeorgeWythe, in 10 Dictionary of American Biog-
raphy (Dumas Malone ed., 1936); Alonzo T. Dill, George Wythe: Teacher of Liberty
(1979); Robert B. Kirtland, George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge (1986);
E. Lee Shepard, George Wythe, in Legal Education in Virginia, 1779-1979: A Bio-
graphical Approach 748 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 1982).
90. See Robert J. Brugger, Beverley Tucker: Heart over Head in the Old South
(1978); Robert J. Brugger, Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, in Legal Education in Vir-
ginia, 1779-1979: A Biographical Approach 642 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 1982).
91. See J. Randolph Tucker, Henry St. George Tucker, in Legal Education in
Virginia, 1779-1979: A Biographical Approach 601 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 1982).
92. John Randolph Tucker, Address Delivered Before the Society of Alumni of
the University of Virginia (Richmond, H.K. Ellyson 1851).
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states to secede from the Union.93 Randy Tucker could also cite in
support of his position the scholarly work of his father, whose lec-
tures on constitutional law were published in 1843. 94
In 1857, Randy Tucker entered public service, winning elec-
tion as Attorney General of Virginia. As a public figure in Virginia
at that time, it is unsurprising that he defended the institution of
slavery,95 although his grandfather had been a leading proponent
of legislated emancipation in 1796.96 He remained in public office
through the War. Because he had performed no service for the
Confederacy, he was not exposed to punishment as Lamar and Jef-
ferson Davis were; indeed, he was among the lawyers preparing a
defense for Davis in the event he was prosecuted for treason or war
crimes. But like so many others, Tucker lost property, relatives
and friends. After the War, he practiced briefly in Middleburg and
then took a position with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad requiring
him to move to Baltimore.
General Lee had retired to the presidency of Washington Col-
lege. In 1865, it established a relation with the law school con-
ducted by a local judge. In 1870, the college decided to appoint a
professor of public law and equity; Randy Tucker was invited to fill
that position. He made haste to do so, and resided in Lexington for
the remainder of his long life.
As a teacher, "Old Ran" Tucker was a partisan of natural law,
and spoke of public duty as derived from religious (although not
necessarily his own Presbyterian), as well as secular authority. He
equated law with justice and it was said that he held it "to be di-
vinely implanted in the human breast" and expressed in the Con-
93. See 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Refer-
ence, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United
States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (The Law Book Exchange, Ltd.,
1996) (1803). The author categorically affirmed the right of states to secede from
the Union at Appendix 73-74.
94. See Henry St. George Tucker, Lectures on Constitutional Law (Richmond,
Shepherd & Colin 1843).
95. It does seem likely that he favored racial segregation. He defended slavery
publicly on at least two occasions. See John Randolph Tucker, A Lecture Delivered
Before the Young Men's Association of Richmond on the 21st of May 1863 (Rich-
mond, W.H. Clemmitt 1863); John Randolph Tucker, Address of John Randolph
Tucker, Esq. Delivered Before Phoenix and Philomathean Societies, of William and
Mary College, on the 3d of July, 1854 (Richmond, Chas. H. Wynne 1854).
96. See St. George Tucker, A Dissertation on Slavery with a Proposal for the
Gradual Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia (Philadelphia, Carey 1796).
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stitution and the Bill of Rights.97 When speaking of such matters,
we are told, he "caught fire." He knew right from wrong, or
thought that he did, and never hesitated to inform his students of
his opinions. One of his warmly held beliefs was that the separa-
tion of West Virginia from Virginia in 1862 was a lawless act,98
inconsistent with the position of nationalists regarding secession
by the slave states, contrary to nature and void. More generally,
he adjured his students "to defend the oppressed and assail the
oppressor; to protect freedom and oppose tyranny; to uphold the
institutional liberties of [the] people and to guard them against all
usurpation; and... [thereby] serve God."99
In 1875, Randy Tucker was elected to Congress, but still con-
tinued to teach. As a national politician, he joined Lamar on many
issues. Yet the two divided on the first issue to which Tucker
spoke: the appropriation of money to fund the centennial of the
Declaration of Independence. Tucker argued that the appropriation
was unconstitutional because it was not within an enumerated
power of Congress under Article 1,100 thus, challenging the opinion
of the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,1' 1 written by his fellow
Virginian, John Marshall. The power to celebrate was a power,
however, that even Lamar was willing to concede to the federal
government. 10 2 Tucker joined Lamar in supporting the appoint-
ment of the election commission in 1876. He also argued for the
electors pledged to support the Democrat Tilden, but accepted the
commission report favoring Hayes, albeit only with great reluc-
tance, declaring that the report "puts fraud at a premium, fair
dealing at a discount."10 3
In Congress and out, Randy Tucker became the premier
spokesman for states' rights as a principle of constitutional law.
97. Davis, supra note 88, at 147.
98. See Laughlin, supra note 88, at 634.
99. Id. at 635-36 (quoting an address given by John Randolph Tucker to the
class of the University of Maryland in 1877).
100. See Vance, supra note 88, at 337; see also John Randolph Tucker, The Re-
lations of the United States to Each Other, as Modified by the War and the Consti-
tutional Amendments (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1877) (discussing the history
of the Colonial era, the Continental Congressional era, the Confederation era and
the Constitutional era).
101. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
102. See 4 Cong. Rec. 629-31 (Jan. 25, 1876) (statement of Lucius Q.C. Lamar).
103. Davis, supra note 88, at 144 (quoting John Randolph Tucker).
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Francis Lieber'0 4 and Tucker's contemporary, Thomas Cooley, 0 5
both ardently antislavery in their sentiments, had also found good
reasons for favoring local government within the framework of the
Republic. Lieber and the earliest political theorists had recognized
as a risk of localized government that a stable faction will control
government to the disadvantage of a helpless minority. This de-
merit of states' rights was never acknowledged by Tucker. In part
due to his advocacy, the idea became the primary emblem of re-
demption politics in the South.10 6
Randy Tucker cautioned his students and his son:
[uin a question which involves your own conduct or rights, if
there be doubt about it when first presented to you, give the
benefit of the doubt against yourself; for in a tribunal in
which you are both judge and advocate it will be difficult to
convince yourself that your own interest should not be main-
tained against that of others. 0 7
But he was seemingly unable to apply that discipline to his own
pleading with respect to states' rights. In every important in-
stance, the state right he invoked and defended served to veil the
claims of the governing class in the South to use the power of local
government to protect and enhance their advantage over the weak-
est citizens in their communities: the freedmen and their
descendants.
Tucker seldom if ever made false claims such as those made by
Lamar regarding the benign desires of Southern state govern-
ments to advance the welfare of black citizens.108 But in his many
pious utterances about civic duty, it is hard to find any evidence
that the duties he proclaimed ran to black citizens as well as white.
104. See Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government (Da Capo Press
1972) (1877).
105. See 1 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 190-
93 (Little, Brown & Co. 1927) (1868).
106. See Stephen Osborne Southall, Inaugural Address Delivered to the Law
Class of the University of Virginia... October 4th, 1866, in Essays on Legal Educa-
tion in Nineteenth Century Virginia 171 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed., 1998).
107. Laughlin, supra note 88, at 635.
108. But see J.R. Tucker, Race Progress in the United States, 138 N. Am. Rev.
163 (Allen Thorndike Rice ed., 1884) (discussing the progressive growth in wealth
and population in immigrant, "colored" and white people in the Union from 1790-
1880).
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Tucker and those for whom he spoke resolved their cognitive disso-
nance by ceasing to notice their African-American neighbors.
In this respect, Randy Tucker, indeed all the descendant Tuck-
ers, were oblivious not only of their fellow citizens, but of the teach-
ing of their patriarch, St. George. Randy must surely have read St.
George's 1796 book urging that emancipation is "an object of the
first importance, not only to our moral character and domestic
peace, but even to our political salvation."1 ° 9 He must also have
read his grandfather's poetry." 0 Consider St. George Tucker's
Fable:
I dreamed last night, the debt of nature paid,
I, cheek by jowl, was by a Negro laid;
Provoked at such a neighborhood, I cried,
"Rascal! begone. Rot farther from my side."
"Rascal!" said he, with arrogance extreme,
"Thou are the only rascal here, I deem;
Know fallen tyrant, I'm no more thy slave!
Quaco's a monarch's equal, in the grave.""1 '
If the poet's descendant absorbed that message, there is no evi-
dence of it.
Because he was gracious and witty, Randy Tucker made many
friends in Congress, on both sides of the aisle; among the closest of
his friends was James Garfield, a New York Republican destined
for the presidency. Unlike Lamar, Tucker was universally
respected and even trusted. It was not to be imagined that he
could have been drawn into a fist fight on the floor of Congress or
even a duel on the field of honor. He was at Saratoga, in 1878,
when an elite group formed the American Bar Association, and, in
1892, he became its president. He won so favorable a reputation
that his merit was recognized by honorary degrees awarded by
Harvard and Yale, universities seemingly eager to do their bit for
intersectional reconciliation. On the occasion of the presentation
at Yale, in 1887, he spoke of the history of the Constitution in
terms glowing with patriotism. While now cheerfully acknowledg-
ing the permanence of the Union as a consequence of the ratifica-
109. See Tucker, supra note 96, at 6.
110. See, e.g., Jonathan Pindar, The Probationary Odes, reprinted in The
Poems of St. George Tucker of Williamsburg, Virginia, 1752-1827, at 82-119 (Wil-
liam S. Prince ed., 1977).
111. A Fable, reprinted in The Poems of St. George Tucker of Williamsburg,
Virginia, 1752-1827, at 68 (William S. Prince ed., 1977).
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, he called on the Sons of
Connecticut to join him in renewing resistance to the centralizing
trends that he and his audience could not fail to observe. 112
In 1889, Randy Tucker retired from Congress to return to full-
time teaching and commenced work on a treatise on the Constitu-
tion. He died in 1897 before completing his book. It was, however,
completed by his son, 113 who succeeded him as a law professor at
Washington and Lee, 114 and as an exponent of states' rights.115 As
one would expect, that work is, among other things, a posthumous
expression of the author's views, and the views of his son, on the
appropriate autonomies of state governments. 16 There is no ac-
knowledgment of the risk that local majorities might employ their
autonomy to impose a caste system on a beleaguered minority.
VII. JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN
Not every lawyer member of the aristocratic class proved to be
a proponent of "redemption." John Marshall Harlan was born, in
1833, into a slave-owning Kentucky family. His grandparents
were early settlers of Kentucky, coming from Virginia, along with
the legendary Daniel Boone. A member of his family, Robert, was
the son of a slave mother; it is uncertain whether Robert was
John's uncle or his half-brother. Their father tried to enroll Robert
in school, but the village fathers of Harrodsburg would not have
him. Robert overcame this disability; he amassed a fortune as a
Forty-niner in California, invested in Cincinnati real estate, owned
thoroughbred race horses, and for a time lived in England, hoping
112. "Joining hands, and uniting hearts, we henceforth in this federal Union,
must labor to save the system in which we are equally interested, from the dangers
which surround it." John Randolph Tucker, The History of the Federal Convention
of 1787 and of Its Work: An Address Delivered Before the Graduating Classes at
the Sixty-Third Anniversary of the Yale Law School, on June 28th, 1887, at 49
(New Haven, Law Dept. of Yale College 1887).
113. See 1 John Randolph Tucker, The Constitution of the United States: A
Critical Discussion of Its Genesis, Development, and Interpretation (Henry St.
George Tucker ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1899).
114. See Charles V. Laughlin, Henry St. George Tucker, in Legal Education in
Virginia, 1779-1979: A Biographical Approach 615, 615 (W. Hamilton Bryson ed.,
1982).
115. See, e.g., Henry St. George Tucker, Woman's Suffrage by Constitutional
Amendment (1916).
116. See 1 Tucker, supra note 113.
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there to escape racial prejudice. 117 Meanwhile, John Harlan was
educated at Centre College and at the Transylvania Law Depart-
ment, where he studied with George Robertson, an emancipation-
ist, whom he revered.118 He practiced law in Frankfort, and
appeared in politics as a Whig. The Whig Party, to whom John
Harlan owed his first political loyalty, collapsed after the death of
Henry Clay, partly in the aftermath of the Compromise of 1850.
Proslavery sentiment gained strength in Kentucky in the
1850s. Even old George Robertson was socialized or intimidated
away from the antislavery position he had so long defended.
Young John Harlan imbibed the prevailing sentiment. For one
election, in 1855, he followed his uncle and Robertson into the
American or "Know-Nothing" Party, and made speeches in its be-
half rousing Kentuckians against the dangers of immigration and
Catholicism. He defended the Dred Scott decision as necessary to
the preservation of white supremacy. 119 In 1859, he stood as an
American Party candidate for Congress in Clay's old district, but
was defeated by what may have been an election fraud, an event
that he later celebrated, saying "[Ifl I had gone to Washington at
twenty-six I might have lost all the character I had."120
Harlan then moved his law practice to Louisville. When war
broke, he devoted his energies to keeping Kentucky in the
Union.12 1 In this, he was the political descendant of Clay, whose
ghost may have appeared in support of many a Union rally across
the state. He was also expressing the ardent teaching of George
Robertson. He became a captain in the militia organized to keep
Kentucky out of the war. When the Confederate army entered the
state, he assisted General Sherman's efforts to drive them out. For
two years, he campaigned with the Union army in the west, lead-
ing a unit of German immigrants to whom he became very close.
When his father died, he resigned his commission to come home
and attend to family matters. He was soon elected Attorney Gen-
eral of Kentucky. In his campaign, still proslavery in his senti-
117. See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma: The First Justice Harlan 10-
20 (1995).
118. See John D. Wright, Jr., Transylvania: Tutor to the West 144 (1975) (dis-
cussing Harlan's encomium to his teachers).
119. See Yarbrough, supra note 117, at 33-37.
120. Id. at 37 (footnotes omitted).
121. See generally Loren P. Beth, John Marshall Harlan: The Last Whig Jus-
tice 53-67 (1992) (giving a fuller account of his military career).
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ments, he scorned the antislavery movement equally with the
rebellion. In 1864, he supported General McLellan, the Demo-
cratic candidate, against Lincoln's re-election, chiefly because of
his opposition to emancipation.
The Thirteenth Amendment, although ratified by Kentucky,
was not well received there when it came into force in 1865. It
spurred a reaction that brought back into power the anti-abolition-
ists who had earlier favored secession. Harlan organized support
for President Johnson and favored Johnson's approach to rebuild-
ing Southern society by empowering the slave-owning class, but he
was not strong enough in that position to win support from Ken-
tucky Democrats, and he was defeated in his campaign for re-elec-
tion. The former third party, proslavery Unionists, of whom
Harlan was one, were forced to choose a new party, between the
antislavery Republicans or the anti-Unionist Democrats. Harlan
chose to support his former commander, Ulysses Grant, for Presi-
dent in 1868, thus casting his lot with the antislavery Republican
party. It proved a wise choice given that he hoped for a public
career.
In 1870, Harlan represented an eleven-year-old black girl in
an action seeking compensation for a vicious assault by her white
employer. 122 He also sought federal protection for African-Ameri-
can citizens of Harrodsburg, who were threatened with massacre
by the Ku Klux Klan. But he provided a defense for a railway
brakeman charged with assaulting a black citizen who had taken a
seat in a passenger car reserved for whites and, like Lamar, he
defended several men charged with participation in Klan raids.
He thought his clients might be innocent, and he needed the fees.
Harlan's sometime law partner and close friend, Benjamin
Bristow, as the United States Attorney, pursued the Klan under
the 1868 federal law and secured twenty-nine convictions, one of
them a death sentence for murder. Bristow was especially vocal in
attacking the Klan and similar groups organized to terrorize black
and white citizens who did not sympathize with their racist objec-
tive of subjecting blacks to a status as close to slavery as possible.
Harlan joined in some of these expressions and assisted in the
prosecution of voting rights violations. He also represented those
Kentucky Presbyterians who had remained loyal to the national
122. See Yarbrough, supra note 117, at 67.
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church in a property dispute with those wishing to transfer alle-
giance to a Southern organization. When the Supreme Court, after
prolonged delay, affirmed the judgment he had won for them, he
pronounced himself "the happiest man in Christendom." i 23 In
1871 and 1875, Harlan stood as the Republican candidate for gov-
ernor of Kentucky. When it was observed that he had earlier de-
fended the proslavery positions he now assailed, his response was,
"Let it be said that I am right rather than consistent."124
Bristow served for a time in the Grant cabinet and provoked
charges of disloyalty to cronies by exposing the corruption of a
group known as the Whiskey Ring. In 1876, he was the candidate
for the Republican nomination for president most in favor with
those seeking to reform the corrupt practices that had soiled the
repute of the Grant Administration. Harlan led the Kentucky del-
egation to the national convention, and when the Bristow cause
was lost, threw Kentucky's support to Rutherford Hayes in prefer-
ence to Senator Blaine. When Hayes took office, there was a va-
cancy to fill on the Supreme Court. The appointment went to
Harlan, who took his seat on the Court in 1877.125
Harlan followed his mentor George Robertson by combining a
law teaching career with his judicial service. He taught for a quar-
ter century at the Columbian Law School, the antecedent to the
law school of George Washington University. He also taught occa-
sionally at the University of Virginia. His classes regularly at-
tracted a large audience; it was reported of Harlan, as of
Robertson, that "[hlis words make one bubble over with enthusias-
tic patriotism."126
As a Justice, Harlan seems to have had limited influence on
his judicial brethren; Holmes disdained him as one whose mind
was "a powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got nearer than
two inches to each other." 27 He is best remembered for his dis-
sents. Two of those bear notice here. One was in the Civil Rights
Cases.'28 These were four cases in which plaintiffs sought to en-
force the Civil Rights Act of 1875, an enactment originally pro-
123. Id. at 74.
124. Id. at 77 (footnote omitted).
125. See also Beth, supra note 121, at 114-29 (elaborating the politics).
126. Yarbrough, supra note 117, at 213 (footnotes omitted).
127. Letter to Frederick Pollock, April 5, 1919, in 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters 7, 8
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
128. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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posed by Charles Sumner that forbade racial discrimination in
places of public accommodation. The Court invalidated the Act,
thereby substantially completing the task of undercutting the Re-
construction legislation. 129 It held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment authorized Congress to enforce the requirement of equal
protection against state and local governments, but not against
private railroads or hotels, because the latter are not engaged in
"state action." Writing his dissent from the same inkstand used by
Chief Justice Taney in writing the opinion of the Court in Dred
Scott, Harlan chastised the majority for its literal-mindedness in
reading the Amendment; he read the Amendment as expressing
the purpose of enabling Congress to remove the badge of inferiority
from former slaves emancipated by the Thirteenth Amendment,
and, therefore, authorizing Congress to forbid any form of racial
discrimination impeding the freedom of freedmen. He conceded
that if an individual declined to hold social intercourse with an-
other for reasons of race that was no business of the government,
but, he argued, a business engaged in working under state author-
ity to provide public services was in no position to claim the private
status of an individual.
Plessy v. Ferguson'30 presented the issue of state authority to
compel segregation. As Redemption was proceeding in the 1890s,
the Black Codes were increasingly in fashion. Plessy challenged a
Louisiana law' 3 1 requiring railroads to separate black passengers
from white, but the Court upheld the law, holding that mere sepa-
ration by race did not imply inequality, so long as the separate
services or facilities were equal in quality. Harlan recognized this
as a deceit, the purpose of separation being to humiliate black citi-
zens. "What," he asked,
can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly cre-
ate and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races,
than state enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground
that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they
cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens?132
129. For a forceful defense of what the Court did, see John W. Burgess, Recon-
struction and the Constitution: 1866-1876 (1907).
130. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. See Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpreta-
tion 28-60 (1987).
132. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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He concluded that such laws were "cunningly devised to defeat the
legitimate results" of the Civil War. 133 As indeed they were.
VIII. EPILOGUE, ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
Daniel Chamberlain, the brave and embattled governor of
South Carolina, left that state and built a large private law prac-
tice in New York. In 1887, he was appointed to the law faculty at
Cornell,13 4 where he lectured on Constitutional Law for fifteen
years. He returned from time to time to Charleston, becoming
again welcome in the drawing rooms of that city. He had come to
think of Reconstruction as a "frightful experiment," producing "un-
bearable misgovernment," that he blamed on the unpreparedness
of black voters. In 1904, he declared "the negroes never, as a race,
were fit to use the ballot. They are no more fit today." In his de-
clining years, he attributed the frequency of lynching to the fre-
quency of blacks raping white women. This late recantation
caused the Charleston paper to acclaim him as "so luminous, so
fearless, so unimpassioned, so just."3 5
The remarkable contrition of Governor Chamberlain confirms
the dogma, widely accepted in the North, that Reconstruction had
been a mistake. Professor John Burgess of the Columbia Law
School (like President Andrew Johnson, a Tennesseean, but a
Unionist and not a descendant of slave owners) 13 6 was outspoken
that placing political power in the hands of the newly emancipated
was a blunder. He argued that civil liberty should have been left
in the hands of the federal judiciary, and the government other-
wise restored promptly to the loyal people of the South. He was
able to declare, in 1902, that "the North has already yielded assent
to this proposition." 137 So it was that the scars of war were left to
fester for another century.
What then is to be said of my four exemplars? One might con-
clude that all my stories reveal is that the restraints of culture are
very strong and control lawyers much as they control others.
Chamberlain, a genuine hero, was moved to recant his own hero-
133. Id.
134. See Harry B. Hutchins, The Cornell University School of Law, 1 Green Bag
473, 480-81 (Horace W. Fuller ed., Boston, The Boston Book Co. 1889).
135. McPherson, supra note 30, at 313 (footnote omitted).
136. For a brief account, see Julius Goebel, Jr., A History of the School of Law:
Columbia University 68-89 (1955).
137. Burgess, supra note 129, at viii.
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ism and belatedly to collaborate with evil. He surely knew what
had happened to the educational reforms he had fostered as an of-
ficer of South Carolina. At the time of his return, almost nothing
was being done in South Carolina to prepare the descendants of
former slaves for the performance of the duties of citizenship, as-
suming, as he did, that such preparation was a necessary precondi-
tion to the recognition of their humanity. Life had worn Daniel
Chamberlain down, and as an old man he had lost his immunity to
moral influenza.
John Harlan's was a voice in the wilderness. He was right in
his constitutional opinions, but it is not easy to depict him as a
great moral hero. He was better able than Lamar or Tucker to see
what was going on and to speak out against it, but his life experi-
ence, his status as a member of the Supreme Court, and the fact
that he was from Kentucky made it infinitely easier for him than
for Lamar or Tucker to see and react against the evil.
In thinking about Lamar or Tucker, it is important to keep in
mind that had they uttered the words of Harlan's Plessy opinion,
their public careers would have come to an end. Tucker could have
earned a handsome living in the private sector, at least in Balti-
more, but it is not clear that Lamar could have found a use for such
talents as he possessed. I doubt whether self-obsessed and profes-
sionally ambitious lawyers of later generations would have done
much better than did Tucker. Indeed, perhaps Tucker can be, at
least, partially excused as a man who was not directly involved in
Redemption, and who may not have been conscious of the degree to
which his unrestrained advocacy of states' rights served the cause
of evil. Under sufficient pressure, alas, many of us would succumb
to such moral blindness.
It is harder to say a kind word for Lamar. It is not, in my
mind, so much that he pursued an evil end, as that he did so by evil
means. It would be asking for more than normal moral courage to
expect a man with his connections to turn his back on the interests
of former slaveowners, for they were his people. Nevertheless, his
eulogy of Sumner was an extraordinarily cynical act. He repeat-
edly lied about events and circumstances in Mississippi. He did
not deceive himself and fantasize about Sumner or about what was
happening around him. He lied to defend brutality that defied the
central moral premise of law and is, therefore, appropriately the
object of a special reproof for his betrayal of the law. That such
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morally upright persons as the trustees of Harvard University
would honor such deeds cannot from this distance justify them. As
a collaborator, he must take his stand in history with the White
People's Party of Vicksburg, with Wade Hampton and the brutal
redeemers of South Carolina, and with the Ku Klux Klan.

